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was not. The court, giving the Corps' decision substantial deference,
ruled the cumulative impact analysis was not arbitrary and capricious.
The court of appeals next considered whether the Corps'
mitigation analysis was sufficient. The Conservation Groups argued
the Corps' mitigation analysis was insufficient. Specifically, the
Conservation Groups disputed the Corps' claim that the project's
cumulative effect would be nonexistent and all impacts would be fully
compensated through mitigation. The Conservation Groups argued
the potential impacts, should mitigation fail, were much greater than
the Corps conceded. To support their position, the Conservation
Groups pointed to mitigation efforts' frequent failure and the Corps'
current mitigation backlog. The court agreed that the Conservation
Groups made valid points in questioning the probability of
mitigation's success. However, the court determined the Corps'
evaluation was thorough enough to survive NEPA's process-oriented
requirements and survive the arbitrary and capricious review standard.
Finally, the appellate court considered whether the Corps
The Conservation Groups
adequately evaluated all alternatives.
argued the Corps did not. In particular, the Conservation Groups
claimed the Corps dismissed the Landside Borrow alternative after
only a preliminary screening. Further, the Conservation Groups
asserted the Corps' selection was misleading because the stated priority
of the Avoid and Minimize alternative was to use landside material.
However, the Corps abandoned that option and chose, instead, to use
the alternative riverside land for material. The court acknowledged
that under NEPA the Corps must rigorously explore and objectively
evaluate all reasonable alternatives. The Corps stated it rejected the
Landside Borrow alternative because the option conflicted with the
Project's purpose-farmland protection. The conflict existed because
costs to acquire landside land were excessive, and Project sponsors and
residents objected. The court affirmed the district court's summary
judgment and held the Corps' analysis was rigorous and thorough, was
not arbitrary and capricious, and, thus, did not violate NEPA.
Brian L. Martin
SIXTH CIRCUIT
M/G Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 234 F.3d 974
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding Water Quality Insurance Syndicate's
("WQIS") request for summary judgment should be affirmed because
it needed neither to defend nor indemnify M/G Transportation
Services, because its underlying insurance claims were based
exclusively on the False Claims Act, not the Clean Water Act).
Former employees filed a complaint against M/G Transportation
Services ("M/G") alleging M/G (1) knowingly falsified records in
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order to hide Clean Water Act ("CWA") violations, and (2) knowingly
falsified records in order to conceal, avoid, or decrease its duty to pay
the United States for fines and clean up costs. M/G settled the dispute
with the former employees and requested a defense and indemnity
from its insurer, Water Quality Insurance Syndicate ("WQIS"). WQIS
refused to indemnify M/G, which prompted M/G's suit against WQIS
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
The district court granted WQIS' motion for summary judgment
because M/G's underlying claim asserted no CWA violations, but was,
instead, based entirely upon the False Claims Act ("FCA"), which was
not covered by M/G's insurance plan. M/G appealed the dismissal
and asserted a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning
whether the underlying claim was covered within the insurance plan.
M/G also argued the district court should have granted its summary
judgment motion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court and held WQIS did not breech its duty to defend and
indemnify M/G in its qui tam action brought under the FCA. The
appellate court reviewed the grant of summary judgment and
recognized it should affirm only if no genuine issue of material fact
existed. The court examined first WQIS' duty to defend.
The court explained that WQIS had a duty to defend when the
complaint stated, or arguably stated, a covered claim, or that the
complaint was so vague, ambiguous, nebulous, or incomplete that a
claim may have existed. The court found M/G's former employees'
based their complaint on neither a covered claim nor an arguably
covered claim, and was not ambiguous or incomplete. The court
based its decision on the fact that the complaint stated two counts
exclusively under the FCA, the complaint made no claims for liability
based on the CWA, the settlement agreement with the employees
expressly reserved CWA liability for the United States, and the CWA
did not contain a qui tam provision that allowed private citizen suits for
clean-up costs. Thus, the court of appeals held the former employees'
complaint stated claims exclusively under the FCA, resulting in WQIS
having no duty to defend M/G.
The Sixth Circuit also rejected M/G's argument that WQIS had a
duty to defend M/G under the sudden and accidental discharge
portion of the insurance policy. The court rejected this argument
because the employees' complaint stated both that M/G had a regular
practice of knowingly dumping and that M/G was convicted of a crime
against the United States for knowingly discharging pollutants.
Accordingly, the court held M/G's conduct was inconsistent with
accidental spillage and the provision did not cover M/G's conduct.
Finally, the appellate court rejected M/G's argument that WQIS
had a duty to indemnify. The court rejected this argument because
the duty to indemnify was contingent upon liability under the policy.
The evidence showed liability was predicated solely on the FCA, not
under the policy. Thus, WQIS was under no duty to indemnify M/G.
The court of appeals found M/G based its complaint exclusively
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on the FCA, not the CWA, and, thus, failed to state a claim covered
under the insurance policy. Because M/G failed to state a claim
covered within the insurance plan, WQIS did not breech its duty to
defend or indemnify M/G in its qui tam action. Accordingly, the court
affirmed WQIS' summary judgment motion and denied M/G's request
for relief.
Kirstin E. McMillan
United States v. Jolly, No. 99-5700, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29907 (6th
Cir. Nov. 20, 2000) (holding, under the Safe Drinking Water Act,
failure to timely challenge an administrative order precluded judicial
review of that order and the district court did not abuse its discretion
in the assessment of penalties and injunction, where a history of
noncompliance and disregard for regulation procedures existed).
Peter E. Jolly appealed a partial summary judgment against him for
violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"). In 1977, Jolly and
his associates formed the JAF Oil Company ("JAF"). JAF owned and
operated eighty-nine injection wells on oil and mineral leases in
Easton Field, Hancock County, Kentucky. Eventually, Jolly became
JAF's sole shareholder, officer, director, and employee. In 1985, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") informedJAF that the wells
did not comply with the SDWA or the Underground Injection Control
program ("UIC"). In 1988, JAF filed for bankruptcy but continued to
operate the wells. In 1992, the EPA issued an administrative order
("AO") to remedy JAF's violations. Jolly continued solely to operate
the wells under the name Strategic Investments Incorporated ("SI").
In 1995, the United States filed a civil enforcement action in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
againstJAF, SI, andJolly to enforce the AO. The district court granted
partial summary judgment to the government on claims thatJAF failed
to meet the AO compliance deadlines. Under state-law veil piercing
theories, the court held Jolly individually liable for the JAF and SI
violations. Additionally, the court held SI liable for failing to reply to
EPA's request for information. Finally, the district court held JAF, SI,
and Jolly liable for failing to comply with SDWA and UIC regulations.
The court granted the government's injunctive request to shut down
the wells, and issued a $500,000 civil penalty to each defendant. Jolly
appealed.
The first issue Jolly raised on appeal was whether EPA denied Jolly
due process when they issued the AO. Under SDWA section 3000h2 (c) (6), the court of appeals did not reviewJolly's compliance with the
AO because Jolly failed to appeal the issuance of the AO. Section
3000h-2 authorized EPA to issue an AO and required the agency to
notify Jolly of his right to request a hearing. The hearing granted Jolly
the right to dispute the order's compliance requirements. Jolly failed
to request a hearing. Once the AO became final, Jolly had another
thirty days to appeal the AO in federal district court. Jolly again failed

